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THE NEEDLE AND THE DAMAGE DONE:
MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN’S SWEEPING RULE FOR
WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAWS ON UNCONSCIOUS
DUI SUSPECTS
Dyllan Taxman*
INTRODUCTION
In a normal year, the annual death toll from drunk driving accidents in the
United States will roughly equal the total number of victims of the September 11th
terrorist attacks and service members killed in the War on Terror combined. 1 And
while every state has enacted increasingly progressive laws to prevent and punish
driving under the influence (DUI),2 episodes of drunk driving remain consistent year
to year and less than one percent of self-reported drunk drivers are arrested.3
Drunken and drugged driving is, both in lay terms and legally speaking, 4 a
compelling public issue. But the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does
not discriminate based on the social cost of specific criminal activity, or at least it
ought not to. That is why the Supreme Court’s 2019 plurality opinion in Mitchell v.
© 2020 Dyllan Taxman. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and distribute
copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy
identifies the author, provides a citation to Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this
provision and copyright notice.
* Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; Ensign, United States
Navy Reserve; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison.
The opinions expressed in this Essay are the author’s own and do not reflect the views or positions
of the United States Courts or United States Navy.
1 Compare DIV. OF UNINTENTIONAL INJURY PREVENTION, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
POLICY IMPACT: ALCOHOL IMPAIRED DRIVING 3 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety
/pdf/PolicyImpact-Alcohol-a.pdf, with US & Allied Killed, WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF.,
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/military/killed (last updated Jan. 2020), and
Brad Plumer, Nine Facts About Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11, WASH. POST (Sept. 11,
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/09/11/nine-facts-about-terrorismin-the-united-states-since-911/.
2 See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL AND
HIGHWAY SAFETY: A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE 2, 165–213 (2011), https://
www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811374.pdf. Crimes involving driving an automobile under the
influence of drugs or alcohol, while given different names across the country, are collectively
referred to as DUI in this Essay.
3 See DIV. OF UNINTENTIONAL INJURY PREVENTION , supra note 1, at 4.
4 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 19 (1979).
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Wisconsin5 may have come as a shock to those who study criminal law and
procedure.
Six years after rejecting any per se warrant exception for blood draws in DUI
investigations, the Mitchell plurality blesses virtually all warrantless blood draws on
unconscious DUI suspects. This Essay analyzes and critiques the Mitchell plurality
opinion, examining warrantless blood draw caselaw before 2019 and evaluating
Mitchell against that precedent. Part I summarizes Mitchell. Part II examines
Mitchell as a departure from precedent and an attempt to create law through the rosetinted lens of public policy.
I. MITCHELL V. WISCONSIN
Mitchell is a watershed DUI exigency case in which the impaired driver was
never seen in his car and no party argued for the exigency warrant exception to
apply.6 Sheboygan police found Gerald Mitchell slurring and stumbling near a lake
after receiving a tip that he was driving drunk in his van.7 The officers administered
a breath test showing Mitchell was past the legal blood alcohol content (BAC) limit
and took him to the police station for a more reliable test.8
But on the way to the station, Mitchell became unconscious and unable to
perform another breath test, leading the officers to take him to the hospital for a
blood draw to determine his BAC, which again measured above the legal limit. 9 The
blood draw was administered while Mitchell was still unconscious.10 Mitchell was
charged with DUI and moved to suppress the results of the BAC test as an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 11 For its part, the
government prevailed in defending the blood draw in state court, arguing
Wisconsin’s implied consent law permitted the warrantless search where an
unconscious Mitchell had not revoked consent to the blood test under the statute. 12
Wisconsin’s thirty-four-year-old implied consent law deems any Wisconsin
motorist in the act of driving as having consented to breath, blood, and urine testing
to determine the presence or quantity of alcohol in their blood. 13 A motorist
suspected of DUI can refuse a BAC test and face the suspension of their driver’s
license.14 The suspendee is entitled to a hearing in which they may argue the

5 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).
6 See generally id.
7 Id. at 2532.
8 Id. This is standard procedure, as a station-administered breath test with a more
sophisticated device provides better evidence in a subsequent indictment and trial. See id.
9 Id.
10 See id.
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(2) (West 2019).
14 Id. § 343.305(9)(a).
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investigating officer lacked probable cause to request a BAC test. 15 A series of U.S.
Supreme Court cases have consistently upheld this form of summary civil penalty
for failure to submit to a BAC test against constitutional challenge.16
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell’s conviction, holding that (1)
by driving on Wisconsin roads and giving police probable cause to suspect Mitchell
had a prohibited BAC, he voluntarily consented to a blood draw per the implied
consent statute, and (2) Mitchell voluntarily forfeited the opportunity to withdraw
consent by drinking to the point of unconsciousness. 17 The implied consent statute
creates a presumption that an unconscious motorist has not withdrawn consent.18
Examining the totality of the circumstances—particularly Mitchell’s self-induced
extreme drunkenness rendering a verbal withdrawal or another form of BAC testing
impossible—the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the statute’s presumption was not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.19
Mitchell petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, again arguing
the warrantless blood draw was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.20 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Wisconsin again argued
in support of the implied consent statute, maintaining that the circumstances of the
case did not warrant applying the exigency exception to the warrant requirement.21
But as the legal world waited for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether
implied consent laws permitted warrantless blood draws on unconscious DUI
suspects, four Justices saw a different justification for the search. 22
Justice Alito’s plurality opinion boldly proclaims that, absent extraordinary
circumstances, a DUI suspect’s unconsciousness always creates an emergency
excusing law enforcement from obtaining a warrant. 23 In Missouri v. McNeely, the
Supreme Court found that the dissipation of alcohol in blood is not sufficient to
create an exigency negating the need for a warrant to conduct a blood draw.24
Instead, the totality of the circumstances surrounding a DUI investigation must
demonstrate that “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement
so compelling that a warrantless [blood draw] is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.”25 The Mitchell plurality accurately describes policing drunk

15 Id. § 343.305(9)(a)(5)(a). Suspended motorists have other potential defenses, but the
issues in a revocation hearing are very limited.
16 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563–64 (1983) (holding refusal to submit
to BAC test can be used in subsequent criminal trial); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 18–19
(1979) (finding no due process violation where driver was arrested on probable cause); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (holding no violation of right against self-incrimination).
17 See State v. Mitchell, 914 N.W.2d 151, 167 (Wis. 2018).
18 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305(3)(b) (West 2019).
19 Mitchell, 914 N.W.2d at 165.
20 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (No.
18-6210).
21 Brief of the Respondent at 52, Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. 2525.
22 See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2534–37 (2019).
23 See id. at 2539.
24 Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 165 (2013) (plurality opinion).
25 Id. at 148–49 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
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driving as a “vital public interest” on which laws and policies limiting permitted
BAC on the roads have a significant impact.26 This demands effective and
admissible BAC testing, which the plurality—again, accurately—acknowledges
requires blood draws when a suspect cannot give a breath sample. 27
Determining that this “compelling interest” creates a “compelling need” to
blood test a DUI suspect who cannot provide a breath sample, the plurality declares
a warrantless blood draw on an unconscious driver meets the first prong of
McNeely.28 But for a constitutional warrantless search pursuant to the exigency
exception, there must also be “no time to secure a warrant.” 29 Schmerber v.
California established that a car accident can create an emergency situation where
police may be required to attend to medical and traffic safety concerns and do not
have time to obtain a warrant.30 The Mitchell plurality holds that an unconscious
DUI suspect always presents an emergency equivalent to the car accident in
Schmerber, finding that a driver’s unconsciousness
is itself a medical emergency. It means that the suspect will have to be rushed to
the hospital or similar facility not just for the blood test itself but for urgent
medical care. Police can reasonably anticipate that such a driver might require
monitoring, positioning, and support on the way to the hospital; that his blood
may be drawn anyway, for diagnostic purposes, immediately on arrival; and that
immediate medical treatment could delay (or otherwise distort the results of) a
blood draw conducted later, upon receipt of a warrant, thus reducing its
evidentiary value.31

Not only do unconscious drivers create a Schmerber-type emergency, Justice
Alito continues, but they actually create a “more acute” exigency than car wrecks.32
Because a driver so drunk as to lose consciousness is particularly likely to crash and
create the type of exigency from Schmerber, the plurality believes the likelihood of
a traffic accident is an added factor in favor of exigency in all unconscious-driver
cases.33 Neither would the Court be convinced by Mitchell’s argument that
technological advances now permit officers to easily obtain a warrant en route to a
hospital, a point Wisconsin conceded in admitting police had time to secure a
warrant in the case.34 Instead, the plurality found that “forcing police to put off other
tasks for even a relatively short period of time may have terrible collateral costs.” 35

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535.
See id. at 2535–37.
See id.
McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).
See 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966).
Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2537–38 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 2538.
Id.
See id. at 2538–39; id. at 2541 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2539 (plurality opinion).
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WHY MITCHELL GETS IT WRONG
A. “Compelling Need”

The plurality’s finding that the “compelling need” to effectively combat DUI
meets the first requirement from McNeely is a gross misstatement of the law.
Mitchell bases its “compelling need” discussion entirely on public policy, engaging
in a lengthy recitation of the social costs of drunk driving and the need for effective
BAC testing to mitigate against them. But that is simply not what McNeely and
other exigency cases require. The Fourth Amendment’s protections do not diminish
in the face of social needs, and courts should decline to craft exceptions to the
warrant requirement based on “fear mongering” and a desire to eradicate specific
criminal behavior, no matter how enticing it may be from a policy perspective.36
Instead, a “compelling need” must arise from the actual emergency in a specific
investigation, determined under the totality of the circumstances.
McNeely’s “compelling need” prong does not simply refer to particular
criminal behavior creating a compelling public interest in investigation and
prosecution, as the Mitchell plurality would have readers believe. Rather, police
may conduct a warrantless search only when “exigencies of the situation make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless [blood draw] is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”37 The “compelling need”
refers to the exigencies of the situation, not the general need to effectively police a
specific crime. Mitchell’s analysis distorts that element. The plurality begins by
describing a “compelling interest” in combatting drunk driving, then shifts, with no
further explanation or support, to describing the same policy factors as creating a
“compelling need” for a warrantless search.38 While a reader would be hard pressed
to disagree with Justice Alito’s description of the “vital public interest” in
eliminating DUI, a “compelling interest” in eliminating a class of criminal behavior
is simply not the same as particular exigent circumstances in a case creating a
“compelling need” to search without a warrant.
That analysis is wholly inconsistent with traditionally excepted exigent
circumstances. For example, police may enter a burning building without a warrant
to put out a fire and investigate its cause. 39 The compelling need in such a case
derives from the nature of the specific circumstances—the fire and its inherent
capacity to injure a building’s inhabitants and destroy evidence—not a compelling
public interest in investigating arson generally. Similarly, the compelling need to
conduct a warrantless blood draw on an unconscious driver must arise from the
exigencies of the particular circumstance, not the general need to perform BAC tests
on an entire class of DUI suspects in all cases. Indeed, this is why McNeely

36
37
v. King,
38
39

See id. at 2548 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2013) (plurality opinion) (quoting Kentucky
563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
See Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2536–37.
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
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specifically mandates that the reasonableness of a warrantless blood draw is
determined by the circumstances in the particular case. 40
If there is a “compelling need” justifying an exigency-excepted search
whenever a DUI suspect cannot give a breath test, then why stop at unconscious
suspects? The plurality’s justification opens the floodgates to an Orwellian “parade
of horribles.” The analysis is equally persuasive for a suspect who merely withdraws
consent to a breath test. Such a warrantless search would be entirely consistent with
Mitchell’s rationale that there is a compelling need to blood test DUI suspects who
cannot provide a breath sample. It would also fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s
precedent emphasizing increased Fourth Amendment protections against
warrantless blood draws compared to breath tests 41 and upholding implied consent
laws because they provide only civil penalties for withdrawing consent. 42 The
plurality’s line of reasoning should also allow police to enter a DUI suspect’s home
without a warrant upon probable cause that they drove drunk. The public interest in
arresting such a suspect is equally compelling, and administering a breath test
pursuant to implied consent laws equally impossible. Entering the home is no
greater a Fourth Amendment intrusion than conducting a medical procedure on an
unconscious and unwilling citizen. Absent a specific emergency, it is hard to believe
our Constitution would permit the former. Incredibly, it now permits the latter.
B. “No Time to Secure a Warrant”
A compelling need is an insufficient basis to blood test an unconscious DUI
suspect without a warrant. The Supreme Court’s precedent in McNeely requires that
an officer has no time to secure a warrant. The Mitchell plurality’s analysis reaches
to find that there is never time to secure a warrant when an unconscious driver must
be taken to the hospital. Schmerber defined the circumstances under which officers
lack time to secure a warrant, and the Mitchell plurality misconstrues its requirement
by inexplicably erasing a predicate condition. The plurality goes on to shore up its
position by alleging an additional exigency factor when a DUI subject is
unconscious—the likelihood of a traffic accident—which belies its untenable
conclusion and departure from precedent.
Any time an unconscious driver is suspected of DUI, Mitchell declares police
are confronted with a medical emergency eliminating the need for a warrant. This
is a misconstruction of Schmerber’s limited holding that the circumstances in that
case, where police were responding to a traffic accident, presented pressing concerns
that could reasonably take priority over obtaining a warrant. The Mitchell plurality
inexplicably interprets Schmerber as creating a per se rule permitting a warrantless
blood draw in all but the most routine DUI investigations. It simply ignores
Schmerber’s limited applicability based on circumstances surrounding a particular

40 McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149.
41 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016).
42 Id. at 2185 (citing McNeely, 569 U.S. at 159; South Dakota v. Neville, 459
U.S. 553, 560 (1983)).
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investigation. Expanding Schmerber to permit warrantless blood draws without a
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis or even similar circumstances to that case, i.e.,
a traffic accident, is particularly troubling given that Schmerber was decided in
1966, before police had the ability to obtain warrants en route to a hospital using a
mobile phone. In fact, Wisconsin conceded that police could have obtained a
warrant before drawing Gerald Mitchell’s blood. Yet, despite this admission, the
Mitchell plurality assures readers that police could not reasonably have obtained a
warrant simply because they needed to take Mitchell to a hospital.
Interpreting Schmerber to obviate the warrant requirement whenever police
may need to take a suspect to a hospital is wholly inconsistent with precedent.
Indeed, in McNeely, police drew blood from a very conscious McNeely at a hospital,
merely because he refused a breath test.43 But the totality of the circumstances in
that case did not demonstrate that police lacked time to secure a warrant, showing a
hospital trip does not by itself preclude obtaining a warrant. Depending on policy,
some jurisdictions might always require a suspect to be taken to a hospital for a
blood draw, regardless of any medical emergency. Given McNeely’s rejection of
hospitalization as sufficient ground for exigency and Schmerber’s limited holding
that a traffic accident can create circumstances giving police no time to secure a
warrant, the Mitchell court’s holding is wholly unsupported.
Perhaps recognizing that a hospital visit alone has been declared insufficient
to create an exigency, the plurality attempts to liken all DUI investigations of
unconscious suspects to the situation in Schmerber. Because a driver so drunk as to
become unconscious is particularly likely to cause a traffic accident, Mitchell argues,
circumstances similar to those creating a Schmerber-type exigency will be common
when a DUI suspect is unconscious. This justification strains credulity. Mitchell
was not involved in a traffic accident. Police did not even arrest him in his vehicle.
Any time an unconscious driver actually creates a traffic accident, police will be
justified under Schmerber to conduct a warrantless blood draw if the circumstances
make obtaining a warrant unreasonable. Permitting warrantless blood draws on
unconscious DUI suspects who do not cause traffic accidents because the Platonicideal unconscious suspect is, in a vacuum, likely to cause one is faulty logic. Take
an example based on a similar justification: (1) police have probable cause to believe
a suspect unlawfully possesses controlled substances; (2) the suspect owns a car; (3)
car-owning suspects are more likely to transport drugs in their cars; and (4) police
may search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe
the car contains evidence of a crime.44 Under Mitchell’s logic, police should be able
to search the suspect without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception, even
if the suspect never stepped in their vehicle, simply because it was likely that other
suspects like them would. Because the suspect belongs to a class likely to potentially
fall within a warrant exception under other circumstances, Mitchell’s logic would
permit a warrantless search based on that speculation. This type of assumptive, cart-

43
44

McNeely, 569 U.S. at 145–46.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
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before-the-horse application of warrant exceptions does not pass constitutional
muster.
CONCLUSION
Police may conduct a warrantless blood draw when the exigencies of a
particular situation create a compelling need and there is no time to secure a
warrant.45 The Supreme Court has found that such an exigency may, depending on
the circumstances, arise in the course of investigating DUI causing a serious traffic
accident where police are confronted with health and safety concerns. 46 In Mitchell,
a plurality of Justices greatly extended these holdings to permit warrantless blood
draws in nearly all DUI investigations where a suspect is unconscious.
Without support, the Mitchell plurality replaces exigency-created compelling
need with a compelling interest in combating certain criminal activity. Under this
interpretation, the government need not determine that exigent circumstances
compel a warrantless search if the criminal activity being investigated is particularly
onerous. The plurality strips its precedent of the requirement to evaluate the specific
circumstances and crafts a new and overbroad warrant exception for an entire class
of suspects. Six years after the Supreme Court found by implication that a hospital
visit was insufficient to excuse the warrant requirement in McNeely, the plurality
finds all unconscious DUI suspects are subject to warrantless blood draws solely
because they need to be taken to the hospital. The plurality’s post hoc justification
that unconscious suspects are more likely to cause traffic accidents assumes too
much, proves illogical, and only emphasizes how unnecessary its expansive holding
truly is.
Benjamin Franklin famously wrote: “Those who would give up essential
Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” 47
As American drivers and pedestrians, we should be comforted by evolutions in the
law keeping us and those we love safe from dangerous criminal activity. As
American citizens enjoying the freedoms our Constitution provides, we should be
alarmed when the liberties we hold most dear are compromised.

45
46
47

See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148–49.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966).
Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (Nov. 11, 1755), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963)

